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Abstract: Market power on each side of a multisided platform, whether in the form of increasing 
prices or decreasing quality, is constrained by the risk of losing sales on the other sides.  That tends 
to weaken market power on each side and encourages platforms to keep prices lower and quality 
higher than they would absent these feedback effects. In some cases the nature of the business 
model, and competition, result in the platform allowing one type of customers to participate in the 
platform for free or even to subsidize their participation. Non-price methods of attracting customers 
are especially important in this case, particularly when the business model adopted by the industry 
makes it difficult for platforms to move from free participation. To provide a reliable assessment of 
competitive constraints, market power analysis must consider the interdependencies in demand by 
the participants on the platform as well as have heightened focus on non-price competition when 
the participation for one group is free. Market shares should be used cautiously in assessing market 
power for multi-sided platforms, especially when they reflect only one side of the platform, and 
therefore do not account for the interdependent customer groups, or concern a free platform side 
where there is no monetary measure of value.  Finally, dynamic competition makes the analysis of 
market power complex because it results in feature competition, and potentially drastic innovation, 
on one side of a platform that has feedback effects on the other side of the platform. The courts and 
authorities have recognized these points in Qihoo 360 v. Tencent, Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission, 
the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, and the Microsoft/Skype merger. These principals should become 
part of the standard analysis of multi-sided platforms by courts and competition authorities globally.  
These concerns are illustrated in the context of multi-sided platforms that offer online services 
where free services and dynamic competition are especially important.  
__________________________________________________________ 
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I. Introduction and Summary 
 
 
 
Many online businesses operate multi-sided platforms that help different types of 
participants get together and enter into value-increasing exchanges.  Facebook, for example, makes it 
possible for friends, businesses, advertisers, and developers to interact with each other. This 
business model has ancient roots going back at least as far as the village matchmaker. Many 
traditional businesses, such as newspapers and shopping malls, use this model. New technologies, 
particularly mobile and the cloud, however, have turbocharged the multi-sided platform business 
model. Online platform businesses are forming at a rapid clip and disrupting not only traditional 
industries but relatively new ones as well.1 
Online multi-sided platforms pose a challenge for competition policy analysis.  Some have 
become large national or global enterprises quickly. Competition authorities are, quite properly, 
vigilant about making sure that these successful firms adhere to sound competition-law principles.  
In making economically reliable assessments, however, competition authorities, as well as courts, 
should account for three features of these online platforms set them apart from many other 
businesses in evaluating the market power held by these platforms. 
First, the demands by the different groups of participants served by multi-sided platforms 
are interdependent. As a simple mathematical matter, that interdependency renders standard 
                                                            
1 See David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms (Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press,  2016) Available at Matchmakers. 
2 See David S. Evans, “The Consensus among Economists on Multisided Platforms and Its Implications for Excluding 
Evidence That Ignores It,” Competition Policy International, April 13, 2013. Available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2249817 
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formulas wrong at least without significant modifications.2 In particular, a price increase, or quality 
decrease, to one group of participants reduces the demand not only by that group but also by the 
other groups who then have fewer participants with which to interact. That does not mean that an 
online platform could not have market power, only that the analysis needs to consider these 
interdependencies and the resulting feedback effects. 
Second, many online businesses make the platform “free” to one group of participants, or 
even subsidize those participants, and earn profits from the other groups of participants who they 
do charge.3 Although the basic concepts of competition policy analysis apply to free prices, many of 
the traditional tools used for competition policy analysis, such as the SSNIP test, do not work, 
without significant modification, as a straightforward mathematical matter.  Most importantly, 
though, the existence of a group of customers who are served for free highlights the importance of 
considering the other interdependent sides in assessing market power.  The platform is ordinarily 
making participation “free” for a group because that group is very important for attracting paid 
participants. Anything that deters “free” users from participating—such as a decrease in quality—
also reduces the incentives for the paid users, who generate all the profits, from participating as well. 
Third, online platforms often engage in constant incremental innovation as they seek to 
obtain advantages over rivals to attract participants on multiple sides and are subject to episodic, but 
increasingly frequent, disruptive innovation in which new, or seemingly different, firms attract their 
customers away.  This dynamic competition is particularly important for “attention” platforms for 
which competition is designed to attract the attention of users, which is then resold to marketers, 
                                                            
2 See David S. Evans, “The Consensus among Economists on Multisided Platforms and Its Implications for Excluding 
Evidence That Ignores It,” Competition Policy International, April 13, 2013. Available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2249817 
3 See Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Table 2.1, and the detailed discussion in Chapter 7.  
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including advertisers, who want to persuade those users to buy things.  An attention seeker is under 
constant threat that someone will come up with an entirely clever new way to grab people’s 
attention.  For competition policy analysis, this means that market power analysis needs to consider 
the constraints imposed by dynamic competition and in new products and services that may appear 
very different than the firm under investigation. 
Courts and competition authorities have come to recognize these points as they have had the 
chance to analyze online platforms and absorb the teachings of the new economic literature on 
multi-sided platforms. Although it did not involve online businesses, the European Court of Justice 
recognized that the analysis of competitive effects, and therefore implicitly the exercise of market 
power, needed to consider the linkages between the separate sides of multi-sided platforms.4 The 
Chinese Supreme People’s Court concluded that dynamic competition among platform businesses, 
including one seeking and selling attention, limited market power.5 Antitrust regulators, including 
those in the European Union and United States, approved Microsoft’s acquisition of Skype and 
Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp in because they recognized how fluid market boundaries and 
dynamic competition would discipline the market power of the merged entities.6  
None of these judgments or decisions in any way suggests that competition authorities 
                                                            
4 Groupement des cartes bancaires v European Commission, Judgement of the Court, September 11, 2014, available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d57c17cb5e4cdc4d5f8196c74dd814db12.e3
4KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Oc3iSe0?text=&docid=157516&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=293160; Federic Pradelles and Andreas Scordamaglia-Tousis, “The Two Sides of the Cartes Bancaires 
Ruling: Assessment of the Two-Sided Nature of Card Payment Systems Under Article 101(1) TFEU and Full Judicial 
Scrutiny of Underlying Economic Analysis,” Competition Policy International Journal, Autumn 2014, Volume 10 Number 2.  
5 David Evans and Vanessa Zhang, “Quhoo 360 v Tencent: First Antitrust Decision by the Supreme Court,” October 
21, 2014, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/qihoo-360-v-tencent-first-antitrust-decision-by-the-
supreme-court. 
6 Case No Comp/M.6281 - Microsoft/Skype, Office of the Publications of the European Union, July 20, 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf  and Case No COMP/M.7217 – 
Facebook/WhatsApp, Office of the Publications of the European Union, March 10, 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf.  
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should let their guard down when it comes to online platforms.  Taken together, however, with the 
new economics of multi-sided platforms, and the growing body of evidence on the dynamics of 
online competition over the last two-decades, these judgments and decisions do indicate that courts 
and competition authorities should exercise caution, and adjust their tools, in analyzing market 
power for online platforms. 
This paper describes the new economics of multi-sided platforms in Section II.  Then it 
shows in Section III how new technologies have turbocharged this business model and led to online 
mobile platforms anchored by websites and mobile apps. Section IV examines the implications of 
the online multi-sided platform business model for the analysis of market power for attention 
seekers. Section V offers some concluding observations. 
 
II. The New Economics of Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
 
 
Although multi-sided platforms have ancient roots economists came to understand them as 
an important, and distinct type of businesses in 2000 when a now classic paper by Rochet and Tirole 
began circulating.7  Soon after, economists began exploring the implications of the new economics 
of multi-sided platforms for antitrust issues.8  As this work has become mainstream, courts and 
competition authorities have gradually absorbed the new learning and applied it to cases. 
 
                                                            
7 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole (2001) "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," Working Paper, November 
26, 2001.  An earlier version was in circulation in 2000. 
8 David Evans, “The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets,” Yale Journal of Regulation, Summer 2003, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=363160. 
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A. Fundamentals of Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
A multi-sided platform is called multi because it provides a way for two, or more, types of 
participants to get together.  It is called a platform because it typically operates a physical or virtual 
place that enables these different types of agents to interact.  Each side of the platform consists of 
the participants who have the option of using the platform to connect.  A shopping mall is a 
physical platform. It provides a place where shoppers and stores—the participants on the two 
sides—can connect.  A ride-sharing app is a virtual platform. It uses cloud-based software, accessed 
through Internet-connected mobile phones, to match up drivers and passengers who are the 
participants on the two sides. 
Multi-sided platforms typically reduce frictions that get in the way of economic agents 
finding each other, interacting, and exchanging value on their own.  Buyers and sellers, for example, 
could find each other in a variety of ways.  A marketplace, such as Flipkart in India, makes it easier 
for them to find each other through, for example, posting tools for sellers and search tools for 
buyers.  It also makes it easier for them to engage in a transaction through the use of electronic 
payment methods and with confidence through Flipkart’s Replacement Guarantees and Seller 
Protection Fund.9 Multi-sided platforms also create value by increasing the odds that participants 
will find counterparties that generate value for value.  An online dating site, such as eHarmony, 
secures many women and men thereby increasing the likelihood that people will find someone they 
would like to date and perhaps even marry. 
                                                            
9 Flipkart, “Returns and Cancellations” available at http://www.flipkart.com/s/help/cancellation-returns; Flipkart, 
“Seller Hub: Getting Started” available at https://seller.flipkart.com/slp/faqs. 
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Multi-sided platforms face a chicken-and-egg problem when they start as a result of what 
they are trying to accomplish. Consider a platform that is in the business of getting Type As together 
with Type Bs. Type As may not want to consider the platform unless they know it has attracted 
Type Bs, but Type Bs may not want to consider the platform unless they know it has attracted Type 
As.  The platform has to figure out a way to get both types of participants on board, in sufficient 
numbers, to provide value to either.  When YouTube started, for example, it had trouble persuading 
people to upload videos since no one was coming to the site to watch them and trouble persuading 
people to come to the site to view videos since there were few videos to watch.10 
Typically, Type As value a platform if it has more Type Bs and vice versa.11  There are, in 
economic terminology, positive indirect network effects and positive feedback effects. A platform 
that gets more Type As becomes more attractive to more Type Bs, which in turn makes it more 
attractive to more Type As, and so forth.  These positive feedback effects drive platform growth. 
YouTube, for example, persuaded more people to upload videos, more people came to watch those 
videos, that got people more interested in uploading videos, and that in turn attracted more traffic to 
the site.12 
Positive indirect network effects can give bigger platforms economic advantages. These are 
often limited in practice, however, by platform congestion, or other diseconomies of scale, and by 
platforms differentiating themselves on one or more sides.  In most countries, for example, there are 
several competing payment card networks despite the positive feedback effects between cardholders 
                                                            
10 For a detailed discussion of how they solved this problem see Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Chapter 5. 
11 As we discuss below ad-supported platforms may have positive externalities in one direction—advertising value more 
viewers but viewers may not value more advertising.   
12 Importantly, positive feedback effects work in reverse as we discuss below. The loss of users on one side leads to 
losses of users on the other side and so on. Positive feedback effects in reverse can result in a death spiral. 
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accepting merchants and despite scale economies in operating the network.  Mobile money 
platforms—where mobile phones are used to send and receive money and provide other financial 
services—are evolving in the same way.  More than 20 mobile wallet providers have started in 
India.13 Based on the experience of countries in Africa, where the mobile money markets are more 
mature, we would expect the in the long run the market will have several competing providers.14 
 Multi-sided platforms differ fundamentally from the traditional firms described in economic 
textbooks and business school courses. Traditional firms typically buy inputs, they make products, 
and they sell those products to customers. They operate along linear supply chain. And since they do 
not have customers with interdependent demands they are single-sided. Multisided platforms sell 
participants in each group access to the participants in each other group. As a result, the customers 
are the main inputs into providing the platform service.  A typical retail store, which is a single-sided 
firm, buys products from wholesale distributors or manufacturers and then sells them to customers. 
A shopping mall, which is a two-sided firm, recruits stores for its mall, and recruits shoppers to 
come to its mall, and provides a platform where the stores get access to the shoppers and the 
shoppers get access to the stores.  
B. Pricing Structures and Strategies 
The fact that the demand for one group depends on the demand by the other group has 
interesting implications for how multisided platforms price their services.  Platforms have to choose 
prices that balance these demands.  Higher prices for Type As would discourage them from 
participating in the platform. That would deter Type Bs from participating in the platform since they 
                                                            
13 See, http://letstalkpayments.com/wallet-wars-in-india-intensifies-with-uber-and-others-being-the-battlefield/ 
14 See GSMA, State of the Industry: Mobile Financial Services for the Unbanked: 2014. Available at  
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SOTIR_2014.pdf  
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would have access to fewer Type A participants.  In fact, it may make sense to price very low to one 
group of participants because the other group will pay a high price for access to them.  That, in fact, 
is the secret behind advertising-supported media as we show below. 
It could even make sense to subsidize one group by charging them a price less than the 
incremental cost of serving them, including letting them use the platform for free, or even giving 
them rewards for participating. Economists have shown that, as a matter of theory, platforms may 
be able to maximize profits by subsidizing one side of the platform in this way and that, as matter of 
fact, many platforms have do just that.15  A popular restaurant reservation site in the U.S., 
OpenTable, for example does not charge people to make reservations with its site and it gives them 
rewards that they apply to reduce the cost of their meals.  Although “free” is popular for online 
platforms it is by no means universal.  Dating sites, such as Trulymadly in India and 
FarmersOnly.com in the US, charge men and women the same. They contrast with nightclubs 
which, in the US, have “Ladies Night Free” pricing. 
C. Advertising-Supported Platforms 
Some multi-sided platforms connect consumers and advertisers.  This might seem odd since 
in many cases consumers do not like advertising. They even spend money to avoid it by, for 
example, buying DVRs that make it easy to skip over ads and paying for alternative sources of 
media, such as Pay TV, or ad-free versions of services, such as Spotify Premium. 
These platforms, however, have figured out ways to connect consumers and advertisers in 
ways that make both groups better off.  They typically offer valuable content to persuade people 
consumer to come of their platforms where these people are exposed to advertising messages. 
                                                            
15 See Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Table 2.1. 
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Meanwhile they persuade advertisers to pay for reaching these people. The viewers are the subsidy 
side of the platform and the advertisers are the money side. So long as the advertisers are willing to 
pay more for delivering messages to these consumers than the platform spends on content the 
advertisers benefit, the consumers benefit, and the platform makes money.16   
One can think of ad-supported platforms as buying eyeballs—usually by paying with 
valuable content—and selling those eyeballs to advertisers.   The Internet has made that far easier as 
we see next.  
 
III.  Online Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
Online platforms have become more common and prominent participants in domestic 
economies and some have rapidly become global players.  Many of these online platforms provide 
free content or services to people to attract their “attention” and then charge advertisers for 
delivering messages to these people. These attention seekers engage in dynamic competition in 
which they are constantly introducing new ways of attracting attention, and copying methods used 
by others, to persuade people to come to their platforms.  Smart mobile phones have accelerated the 
pace of dynamic competition, the frequency of disruptive innovation, for online platforms. 
A. The Technology Revolutions Behind Online Platforms 
                                                            
16 In fact this advertising supported media is a clever way of solving the following exchange problem.  Rahul would pay 
$20 to meet Aditya. Aditya doesn’t like Rahul and would pay $5 to avoid him.  Still there is room for trade and an 
intermediary can make Aditya and Rahul both better off.  The intermediary pays Aditya $12 to meet Rahul and charges 
Jose $14 for the introduction. Aditya is ahead $7 (-$5+$12), Rahul is ahead $6 ($20-$14), and intermediary earns a profit 
of $2 (-$12+$14).  In the case of advertising, instead of paying $14, the media property provides entertainment or other 
content that Aditya values at $14. 
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Several mutually reinforcing technologies, and the businesses the make those technologies 
available, have made multi-sided platforms increasingly powerful methods for reducing frictions, and 
creating valuable new services, on a global basis. 
1. The PC-Web-Browser Revolution 
The first wave of innovation launched the web-economy in the mid 1990s.  The Internet 
provided a physical network and standards for connecting computers around the world, the Web 
provided a framework and software technologies for creating and linking content on those 
computers, and the web browser provided an application for personal computers that enabled 
people to consume Web content. 
Businesses could use these technologies to provide content and services on websites.  The 
cost of doing so was relatively low since it involved writing software, using server computers, and 
the small fees for connecting to the Internet.  And the company could reach an entire country 
immediately and, in fact, much of he world.  Almost all the content, data, and processing work 
resided in the cloud and consumers accessed it through using a browser on their Internet-connected 
personal computers. 
The number of web-based businesses and Internet traffic exploded following the launch of 
the commercial Internet in the 1990s.  A number of global online platforms emerged such as 
Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Google, PayPal, and Yahoo.  This growth was made possible by the 
development and expansion of increasingly fast broadband delivered over fixed wires such coaxial 
cable, fiber optic line, or even a copper wire.   
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2. The Mobile-App Revolution 
Mobile phones were in widespread use in the U.S. and other countries by the late 1990s. 
Cellular networks, however, were not able to carry enough data fast enough for people to use the 
Internet from their mobile phones. Innovations in cellular technology starting in the mid 1990s 
increased the potential capacity and speed of cellular networks and mobile devices for making better 
use of these faster more capacious broadband technologies.  Anticipating the roll out of mobile 
broadband a number of companies started investing in developing various components of smart 
phones, including modem and processing chips, operating systems, and handsets in the early to mid 
2000s. 
Innovations by Apple and Google, in particular, have led to spread of smart mobile phones 
around the world, enabling billions of people to consumer Internet-based services and millions of 
businesses to provide mobile-app based services to them. Apple introduced the iPhone, which 
consisted of a powerful computer, a mobile operating system, and a standard set of applications 
including a mobile browser in June 2007.  Google invested in developing a mobile operating system, 
Android, which it ran as an open-source project, and developing and organizing an ecosystem of 
handset makers, mobile network operators, and other technology partners. It introduced the first 
Android phone in October 2008.17  Apple and Google also stimulated the production of mobile 
apps by providing software tools for developing apps for their operating systems, creating a quality 
certification process for these apps, and creating “app stores” that provided centralized places for 
developers to distribute apps and for users to download them on their mobile devices. 
                                                            
17 Kent German, “A Brief History of Android phones,” August 2, 2011, http://www.cnet.com/news/a-brief-history-of-
android-phones/. 
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Smart mobile phones changed the online game in a number of ways as they became widely 
adopted, millions of apps became available for them, and faster and more capacious mobile 
broadband networks were rolled out around the world.  People could access the Internet anywhere 
and anytime using smartphones running on mobile broadband networks. More people could do that 
because mobile phones and data plans were much cheaper than buying PCs and fixed broadband 
connections.  Businesses could reach billions of people by developing mobile apps and distributing 
them in apps stores. Apps could exploit the GPS capabilities of phones, which make it possible to 
know where individuals are in physical space.  This, together with the related development of the 
“Internet of Things” is leading to the deep integration of the online and physical worlds. 
3. The Movement from PCs/Browsers to Mobile/Apps 
 Businesses that want to provide online services, and consumers who want to consume 
online services now have several choices.  App developers can develop websites that people can visit 
from browsers on their PCs or from their mobile devices. They can develop mobile apps that people 
use on their mobile phones or mobile browser-apps that try to mimic these apps. Different 
businesses have adopted different approaches depending on the content and services they are 
providing. Consumers have, however, shifted their use dramatically from PCs to mobile devices and 
from using websites to using apps.  
Consider the US. Between 2008 and 2015 the proportion of time spent online using mobile 
devices increased from 12.7 percent to 54.6 percent. Commerce has moved dramatically from PCs 
to mobile. Americans made 57 percent of their online purchases from mobile devices in 2014 
14 
 
compared with likely none before 2010.18 On Thanksgiving Day, November 26, 2015, around 60 
percent of US website visits were made from mobile devices in the US.19 Advertising has moved to 
mobile in response. Facebook earned 78 percent of its global advertising revenue from mobile in 
2015Q320 compared with 14 percent in 2012Q3.21  These trends are expected to continue.22 
On mobile devices people typically access Internet-based services using mobile apps rather 
than using websites with their mobile browser.  Mobile apps accounted for nearly 90 percent of the 
time Americans spend using mobile apps or browsers on their mobile devices.23 As a result the 
proportion of time people spend online using mobile apps has increased from what was likely a very 
low level in 2008 to 54 percent in 2015.24 This share is likely to increase further as the shift from PCs 
to mobile continues and as the shift from browser-based to mobile app-based delivery continues.25 
Many countries have had low penetration of PCs and fixed broadband because of their early 
stages of economic development. The adoption of smart mobile phone and mobile broadband are 
increasing rapidly in those countries because it is cheaper and even more rapidly in the faster 
                                                            
18 David Murphy, “IBM: Christmas Day Sales Up 8.3 Percent, Mobile Purchases up 20.4 Percent,” PC Magazine, 
December 26, 2014, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2474217,00.asp.  
19 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Black Friday Shopping Shifts Online as Stores See Less Foot Traffic,” New York Times, November 
27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/28/business/black-friday-shopping-shifts-online-as-stores-see-less-foot-
traffic.html?_r=0.  
20 Facebook Inc., “10-Q for Period Ending September 30, 2015,” p. 40. 
21 Facebook Inc., “10-Q for Period Ending September 30, 2012,” p. 27. 
22 Chantal Tode, “M-Commerce Sales to Reach $142B in 2016: Forrester,” Mobile Commerce Daily, October 8, 2015, 
http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/mcommerce-sales-to-reach-142b-in-2016-forrester; Matthew Hobbs, “Internet 
Advertising,” 2015, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/entertainment-media/outlook/segment-insights/internet-
advertising.html.   
23 Simon Khalaf, “Seven Years into the Mobile Revolution: Content is King … Again,” Flurry Insights, August 26, 2015, 
http://flurrymobile.tumblr.com/post/127638842745/seven-years-into-the-mobile-revolution-content-is; 
https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Presentations-and-Whitepapers/2015/The-2015-US-Mobile-App-Report.  
24 comScore, “The 2015 U.S. Mobile App Report,” September 22, 2015, 
https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Presentations-and-Whitepapers/2015/The-2015-US-Mobile-App-Report.  
25Total time spent on digital media using mobile apps increased at a compound annual growth rate of 38 percent per 
year between 2013 and 2015, compared to 7 percent for desktops and 24 percent for mobile browsing.  The share for 
mobile apps increased from 43 percent to 54 percent over this period, an increase of 11 percentage points, or a 
compound annual growth rate of 12 percent.  Data are not available back to 2008. 
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growing ones. More than 90 percent of Facebook's Indian users26 and 60 percent of Amazon’s 
Indian users27 access it through mobile devices. In 2014, leading Indian e-commerce companies, 
including Flipkart and Snapdeal, derived the majority of their gross merchandise value from mobile 
devices.28  
B. Overview of Online Multi-Sided Platforms 
The development of online technologies has made it cheaper and easier to reduce frictions 
through multi-sided platforms and to do so over large geographic areas.  The Internet makes it 
possible to connect participants over wide geographic areas and in principle from around the world.  
Software programs running on high-speed computers in the cloud provide powerful technologies 
for finding good matches and consummating exchanges.  Mobile has extended these capabilities 
throughout the day and throughout physical space. 
Almost immediately after web commerce became viable in the mid 1990s entrepreneurs 
started using the new technologies to start multi-sided platforms.  Not everyone chose a multi-sided 
model. Amazon, for example, started with a typical retail model in which it bought products, initially 
books, wholesale and sold them to people through its online store.  Many, though, used a multi-
sided approach often because it was the only way to provide the product or service.  eBay started an 
online marketplace for buyers and sellers, match.com started an online matchmaker for men and 
                                                            
26 BGR, “90% of Facebook’s 132 million users from India come from mobile phones,” September 27, 2015, available at 
http://www.bgr.in/news/90-of-facebooks-132-million-users-from-india-come-from-mobile-phones/ 
27  Ashwini Gangal, “’Over 60 per cent of our traffic comes through mobile’: Manish Kalra, Amazon India,” August 28, 
2015,  http://www.afaqs.com/interviews/index.html?id=469_Over-60-per-cent-of-our-traffic-comes-through-mobile-
Manish-Kalra-Amazon-India  
28 BGR, “Smartphone shopping to contribute up to 70 percent of total revenue in online shopping: Experts,” November 
30, 2014, available at http://www.bgr.in/news/smartphone-shopping-to-contribute-up-to-70-percent-of-total-revenue-
in-online-shopping-experts/. 
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women, and Yahoo started a online portal that used content to attract viewers and then attracted 
advertisers who wanted to reach those views. 
Many of the established platforms followed the shift from the PC-browser-centric model to 
the mobile-app centric model.  Entrepreneurs, however, discovered that the mobile-app centric 
model provided new opportunities.  Uber, for example, has built a business that connects drivers 
and riders in real-time and in physical space using mobile apps. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of online multi-sided platforms based on their presence 
in the US, which reflects global platforms, and India, which reflects domestic platforms and global 
ones.  In each country we have selected 20 platforms. We include the largest ones based on the 
number of times over the space of a month people clicked on pages on those sites (“pageviews”). 
That is a particularly useful measure for content-oriented sites.  We have erred on the side of 
showing diversity of online platforms and the table is not intended to be an accurate summary of the 
economically most important online platforms. In each case we summarize the multi-sided business 
model and the extent to which one side receives service for free. 
 As these tables show online platforms are highly diverse. However, they often have several 
of the following features that are relevant for antitrust analysis.  First, they are all based on software.  
They can add new features, and introduce new products and services, by modifying or adding 
software code and related databases.  That is much different than physical platforms.  Second, the 
marginal cost of participants to software-based platforms running in the cloud is virtually zero. That 
increases the normal tendency of multi-sided platforms to allow a group of participants to use the 
platform for free.  Third, dynamic competition is more intense for online platforms because 
technological change has reduced the capital cost of starting a platform and the software-based 
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nature of these platforms makes it easier for platforms to offer new products and services in 
competition with other platforms.29  Fourth, dynamic competition is also more intense for online 
platforms because the participants have lower switching costs, and face less lock-in, than on physical 
platforms where they often have to make costly sunk-cost commitments to the platform.  Fifth, 
online platforms are in the midst of a massive technological shift resulting from the move of 
consumers from the PC-browser to the mobile-app centric way of using online services.30   These 
points are especially true one of the largest categories on online platforms. 
 
                                                            
29 Case No Comp/M.6281 - Microsoft/Skype, Office of the Publications of the European Union, July 20, 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf ; “FTC Notifies Facebook, WhatsApp of 
Privacy Obligations in Light of Proposed Acquisition,” Federal Trade Commission, April 10, 2014, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-notifies-facebook-whatsapp-privacy-obligations-light-
proposed; and Case No COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, Office of the Publications of the European Union, March 
10, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf. 
30 See Hemant Bhargava, David S. Evans, and Deepa Mani, “The Move to Smart Mobile and its Implications for 
Antitrust Analysis of Online Market In Developed and Developing Countries,” Forthcoming.  
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Webpage Category
Page Views in 
November 2015
Free participants Paid participants
FACEBOOK.COM
Social Media - Social Networking, Social 
Media
122,298,603 People and many app developers
Advertisers and some app 
developers
GOOGLE.COM Search/Navigation 75,325,987 Searchers and websites Advertisers
YOUTUBE.COM Entertainment - Multimedia, Entertainment 38,899,360 Video uploaders and viewers Advertisers
YAHOO.COM Portals 25,612,235 Viewers Advertisers
AMAZON.COM Retail 11,490,679
Buyers do not pay Amazon 
MarketPlace
Sellers pay Amazon for sales and 
advertising
BING.COM Search/Navigation 9,080,541 Searchers and websites Advertisers
CRAIGSLIST.ORG
Directories/Resources - Classifieds, 
Directories/Resources
8,964,010 Viewers and many listers of ads Certain categories of listers for ads
MSN.COM Portals 8,483,598 Viewers Advertisers
EBAY.COM Retail 6,197,320 Buyers do not pay eBay
Sellers pay eBay for sales and 
advertising
AOL.COM Portals 5,363,234 Viewers Advertisers
ESPN.COM Sports 3,492,807 None Viewers pay and advertisers pay
SWAGBUCKS.COM Services - Coupons, Services 3,131,420 People Advertisers/marketers
LINKEDIN.COM
Social Media - Social Networking, Social 
Media
2,722,905 People for basic service
Advertisers and people for 
premium service
PAYPAL.COM
Business/Finance - Personal Finance, 
Business/Finance
2,043,564 Receivers of funds Senders of funds
GROUPON.COM Services - Coupons, Services 1,966,864 People do not pay Groupon
Groupon is paid by businesses for 
marketing and advertising services
IMGUR.COM Social Media 1,892,345
Uploaders of pictures and viewers 
of them
Advertisers
ANSWERS.COM
Directories/Resources - Reference, 
Directories/Resources
1,881,808 People looking for information Advertisers
TWITTER.COM
Social Media - Social Networking, Social 
Media
1,675,644 People who send and read tweets Advertisers
INDEED.COM
Career Services and Development - Career 
Resources, Career Services and 
Development
1,406,674 People looking for jobs Employers advertising jobs
CNN.COM
News/Information - General News, 
News/Information
1,362,865 Viewers Advertisers
Source: comScore
Table 1: Summary of Most Frequented Platforms in the US
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Company Category Free participants Paid participants
Google.com Search/Navigation Searchers and websites Advertisers
 Facebook.com
Social Media - Social Networking, Social 
Media
People and many app developers Advertisers and some app developers
 Youtube.com Entertainment - Multimedia, Entertainment Video uploaders and viewers Advertisers
Amazon.com Retail
Buyers do not pay Amazon 
MarketPlace
Sellers pay Amazon for sales and 
advertising
Yahoo.com Portals Viewers Advertisers
Flipkart.com Retail
Buyers do not pay Flipkart 
MarketPlace
Sellers pay Flipkart for sales and 
advertising
 Indiatimes.com
News/Information - General News, 
News/Information
Viewers Advertisers
 Linkedin.com
Social Media - Social Networking, Social 
Media
People for basic service
Advertisers and people for premium 
service
Twitter.com
Social Media - Social Networking, Social 
Media
People who send and read tweets Advertisers
Snapdeal.com Retail
Buyers do not pay Snapdeal 
MarketPlace
Sellers pay Snapdeal for sales and 
advertising
Stackoverflow.com Q&A Website
People looking for information 
related to computer programming
Advertisers
 Ebay.in Retail Buyers do not pay eBay
Sellers pay eBay for sales and 
advertising
 Ndtv.com
News/Information - General News, 
News/Information
Viewers Advertisers
Jabong.com Retail
Buyers do not pay Jabong 
MarketPlace
Sellers pay Jabong for sales and 
advertising
Rediff.com Portals Viewers Advertisers
Quikr.com Directories/Resources - Classifieds, Directories/ResourcesViewe s and many listers of ads Certain categories of listers for ads
 Naukri.com Employment Recruiting People for basic service
Advertisers and people for premium 
service
 Pinterest.com
Social Media - Social Networking, Social 
Media
Viewers Advertisers
imdb.com Entertainment - Movies, Entertainment Viewers Advertisers
shopclues.com Retail
Buyers do not pay Shopclues 
MarketPlace
Sellers pay Shopclues for sales and 
advertising
Source: http://www.alexa.com/
Table 2: Summary of Most Frequented Platforms in India
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C. Online Attention Seekers   
At is has turned out many online platforms make money primarily by helping businesses sell 
things to consumers through advertising and marketing.31  As we discussed above the way they do 
this is simple but clever.  They provide reasons to consumers to come visit them by offering 
engaging content or services valued by consumers.  Consumers typically do not pay for obtaining 
the content or services. They are free in that sense.  But consumers are receiving value by coming to 
these platforms. In that sense the real price of participating in the platform is even better than free, it 
is negative, so that platform is paying consumers to come visit.  Once they have gotten consumers 
to spend time of the platform they allow businesses to present advertising or other marketing 
messages to consumers.  They charge businesses for this and that is how they cover their costs and 
make profits.  
Online attention seekers compete to get the attention of consumers and then sell portions of 
that attention to businesses that aren’t able to get it easily on their own. They seldom make any 
money directly from providing content or services to consumers.  Recognizing this is important for 
understanding the dynamics of competition.  Entrepreneurs compete to come up with clever ideas 
for attracting eyeballs—say by inventing tweeting or pinning—not so they can charge people for 
clever content or services they are providing but so they can sell access to those eyeballs to 
advertisers. Attention seekers may come up with ways to differentiate themselves from the 
standpoint of attracting consumer attention and selling advertising. But overall they are competing 
to attract a limited pool of attention and advertising and marketing budgets to reach those 
consumers. Now consider the five features that we highlighted above. 
                                                            
31David Evans, “Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms,” Journal of Competition Law & Economics, May 14, 2013, 
Volume 9 Issue 2:313-357, http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/313.abstract.  
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Attention seekers are all built on software platforms. They do not have printing presses, 
cable networks, or radio towers.  When they want to add features to the platforms they hire software 
engineers to write code. They can often make changes quickly and roll those changes out globally.  It 
took about 5 months, for example, for Facebook to develop Facebook Messenger which is one of 
the leading apps for smartphones.32 
The marginal cost of another participant on an attention seeker is essentially zero.  Google 
does not incur any significant out of pocket cost when a person conducts another search or when it 
puts another search ad on a search results page. That is true for virtually all attention seekers with 
the exception of some, such as Pandora, that have to pay for the content they deliver. 
The capital cost of starting an attention seeker is low and that has intensified dynamic 
competition.  That is more so true now as a result of mobile apps. The founders of WhatsApp had 
to write software code so that messaging app would work for Apple and Android phones and for 
the cloud-based service those apps were connected with.33  Once they did that they had a platform 
that could provide messaging services globally to unlimited number of users with the addition of 
some cheap server capacity. Many other mobile messaging apps have started. They compete with 
older messaging PC-based messaging apps as well as the new mobile-based ones. 
It is easy for consumers to reduce the amount of attention they provide one platform, or 
drop it altogether, and increase the amount of attention they provide another platform. Since the 
platforms are free they can use as many as they want and switch their attention depending upon the 
                                                            
32 Facebook, “Building Facebook Messenger,” August 12, 2011, available at 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/building-facebook-messenger/10150259350998920/. 
33 One estimate is that it would cost about $250,000 and take about nine months to build a robust version of an app like 
WhatsApp.  See Courtney Boyd Myers, “How much does it cost to build the world’s hottest startups?” TNW News, 
December 2, 2013. Available at http://thenextweb.com/dd/2013/12/02/much-cost-build-worlds-hottest-
startups/#gref  
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relative attractiveness to spending time on one or the other.  The consumer bears no cost from 
shifting time from looking at Yahoo to looking at Flipboard. While some online platforms involve 
some cost of switching in practice it does not limit people from doing so.  In the case of social 
networks, Americans switched from Friendster to MySpace and then from MySpace to Facebook.34  
People in other countries, such as Brazil and India, switched from Orkut to Facebook.35    
  Finally, the shift of consumers from looking at websites with their browsers to using apps 
on their mobile phones has resulted in dramatic changes in attention seeking platforms.  There has 
been a dramatic increase in the amount of online attention available as a result of people being able 
to go online with their mobile devices for much more of the day. The opportunities for connecting 
businesses with consumers have also changed now that people carry mobile phones all the time and 
in particular when they go shopping.  Search is one of the attention-seeking businesses that is 
undergoing disruption as a result of this.36  Search engines index websites and allow people to find 
things on those websites. But now an enormous amount of online activity is happening with mobile 
apps.  At this point it is unclear how people will be able to find app-based content and what 
companies will ultimately succeed in doing so.   Apple, Facebook, and Google are among the 
companies that are trying to figure this out.37 
What’s should be clear from the discussion so far is that multi-sided platforms are governed 
by different rules than traditional linear businesses and that competition among online platforms is 
                                                            
34 Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Chapter 9. 
35 Elena Trost, Social Media Marketing in BRIC Countries (Zurich, Lit Verlag GmbH & Co., 2013), Chapter 3. 
36 Erin Griffith, “Facebook, Google and the battle for mobile intent,” September 8, 2015, available at 
http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/facebook-google-mobile-search-advertising/  
37 Erin Griffith, “Facebook, Google and the battle for mobile intent,” September 8, 2015, available at 
http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/facebook-google-mobile-search-advertising/  
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often more intense and more dynamic than among physical platforms.  Both point have important 
implications for antirust analysis. 
  
IV. Market Power Analysis of Online Attention Seekers 
 
Economists typically assume that the demand for a product depends on the price of that 
product, the price of substitute products, and the price of complementary products. The demand for 
a particular brand of beer, for example, depends on the price of that brand, the prices of other kinds 
of beer and other alcoholic beverages, and perhaps the demand for nuts, chips, and other things that 
people eat with beer.  Most economic theories relied on in antitrust analysis, such as those involving 
predatory pricing, and economic tools, such as SSNIP tests, are based on this model of product 
demand. 
All of those factors are relevant for considering the demand for product and services 
provided by multi-sided platforms. But those standard factors do not include the most critical factor 
that drives the demand for platforms. The demand by members of one group of customers, say 
Type A, depends, roughly speaking, on the participation of the other group of customers, say Type 
B, in the platform.38  To avoid being mathematically wrong and unreliable, economic models and 
tools must account for the interdependent demand and consider all sides of the platforms.  The fact 
that the demands by the various groups of platform participants are interdependent also means that 
                                                            
38 More precisely, platform customers care about the likelihood that they will be able to enter into valuable exchange on 
the platform; we are using the number of potential trading partners as a short-hand for describing all of the 
characteristics of one side of the platform that affects the demand by the other side. 
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analyses that focus on one group of participants in isolation are not correct as a straightforward 
mathematical matter.39 
Antitrust analysis needs to examine the platform overall taking these interdependencies into 
account.40  Generally, that requires treating the platform as a whole, rather than focusing on one 
group of customers or another, or at least carefully considering the inter-linkages between these 
groups. Platform competition tends to force overall prices down and reduces the profits the 
platform can earn.  Typically, though, it does not force prices down to incremental costs for all, or 
even any, sides of the platform. Even with competition platforms may choose to subsidize one side 
of the platform and make profits for other sides of the platform. 
The magazine business, for example, is highly competitive yet most magazines subsidize 
readers; the cover price for the magazine often does not cover printing and distribution costs let 
along the cost of the content that attracts readers.  In fact, competition to attract participants to the 
platform can result in greater subsidies to one side. For example, in the U.S., competition among 
payment card networks apparently resulted in bidding up payments (called interchange fees) to 
                                                            
39 David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, “The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses,” January 30, 
2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185373; Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol, eds., Oxford 
Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Oxford University Press, 2015; University of Chicago Institute for 
Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 623. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2185373; David Evans, 
“The Consensus Among Economists on Multisided Platforms and its Implications for Excluding Evidence that Ignores 
It,” Competition Policy International, (April 13, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249817 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2249817. 
40 In Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission, the European Court of Justice concluded that to analyze competitive 
effects it was necessary to consider the two interlinked sides of the platform. See Groupement des cartes bancaires v 
European Commission, Judgement of the Court, September 11, 2014. In, Qihoo 360 v. Tencent, the Chinese Supreme 
People’s Court found that it was necessary to consider platform competition in evaluating market power. See, David 
Evans and Vanessa Zhang, “Quhoo 360 v Tencent: First Antitrust Decision by the Supreme Court,” October 21, 2014, 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/qihoo-360-v-tencent-first-antitrust-decision-by-the-supreme-court; 
Charles Rivers Associates, “Qihoo v. Tencent: economic analysis of the first Chinese Supreme 
Court decision under Anti-Monopoly Law” February 2015, available at 
http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/China-Highlights-Qihoo-360-v-Tencent-0215_0.pdf  
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banks that issue cards to consumers.41  As a result, evidence that price is great than incremental cost 
on one side provides no meaningful evidence that the platform has market power and evidence that 
the platform charges a price less than marginal cost on another side provides no meaningful 
evidence that the platform is engaging in predatory pricing.  The analyst needs to look at the 
platform overall to assess market power and predation.  In practice, it often makes sense to look at 
pricing and competition on both sides but then accounting for the interdependencies. 
 This section applies these general principles to the analysis of market power for online 
attention seekers which is one of the most important categories of online platforms. 
 
A. Free and Feature Competition 
Traditional antitrust analysis assesses market power by considering whether the firm can 
increase price profitably.  That approach does not make any economic or business sense for online 
attention seekers.  The business is based on paying consumers to use the platform and charging 
advertisers for access to those consumers.  An exercise of market power over consumers would 
could involve increasing the price to them but, more likely, would involve reducing the quality of the 
content and services the platform is providing to attract their attention.42 Whether that reduction in 
quality is profitable depends on the extent to which it would decrease the attractiveness of the 
platform to advertisers.  A platform could consider reducing its expenditures on quality 
improvements by $1 million. Whether this is profitable depends on whether the lower quality would 
reduce the amount of advertising, given the lower attention it attracts, by less than $1 million. 
                                                            
41 OECD, “Competition and Payment Systems,” June 28, 2013, 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/PaymentSystems2012.pdf. 
42 The decision by online attention seekers to charge fees is quite rare even for ones that are highly successful.  Some 
online newspapers have tried paywalls with mixed success. 
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This highlights the importance of feature and quality competition. Online attention seekers 
do not compete based on price. Therefore, to assess market power, one needs to assess the extent to 
which a lower provision of quality would divert attention to other online platforms. In considering 
that diversion there is no business or economic reason to limit the inquiry to online platforms that 
provide the same service.  It is an empirical question whether consumers would turn their attention 
to completely different services. 
In practice market power analysis for online attention seekers can consider substitution 
possibilities by considering a small but significant increase in price or a small but significant decrease 
in quality.  Either one reduces the value of the platform for users and could induce switching.  The 
SSNIP, however, must consider small absolute increase in price since a percentage increase is 
undefined when the initial price is zero.  The Chinese Supreme People’s Court, in Qihoo 360 v. 
Tencent, decided that the SSNIP evidence was not relevant and considered informally how consumers 
would react to small but significant decreases in quality (SSNDQ) of the instant message products 
under consideration.43 
Since attention makers make virtually all of the revenue and profit from advertisers the other 
issue concerning market power is whether they can take actions that increase the price of advertising 
above competitive level.  The analysis of that question needs to consider the extent to which 
advertisers can get the attention of consumers in other ways and the extent to which the online 
platform offers some consumer attention, perhaps based on demographic profiles or the context in 
which they’ve captured that attention, for which there are limited substitutes. 
                                                            
43 See, David Evans and Vanessa Zhang, “Quhoo 360 v Tencent: First Antitrust Decision by the Supreme Court,” 
October 21, 2014, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/qihoo-360-v-tencent-first-antitrust-decision-by-
the-supreme-court. 
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Free pricing, however, shouldn’t be analyzed in isolation. In fact, the existence of consumers 
being offered something for nothing is almost always an indication that the business is a multi-sided 
platform.  That means that the demand by consumers on the “paid side” is linked to the demand by 
consumers on the “free side” to the demand.  The SSNIP and SSDNQ analyses should account for 
the interdependencies of demand for taking a holistic approach, and considering the platform 
overall, or by carefully considering the linkages in demand and their implications for competitive 
constraints. 
B. New Entry, Cross-Category Entry, and Feature Competition 
Market power analysis needs to consider the ease of entry and of feature competition for 
online attention seekers.  As discussed above the capital cost of entry for online attention seekers is 
low. The main difficulty is attracting consumers to the platform with persuasive content and 
services.  Importantly, though, the analysis needs to at least consider the impact on the platform of 
entry by completely different services.  For example, suppose Facebook reduced its investment in 
the quality of its social networking platform.  It could lose advertising revenue in part because that 
increases the likelihood that consumers will more likely to shift attention to “the next new thing”—
not necessarily to a social network—and that will cost the company advertising revenues. In 
addition, market power analysis needs to consider entry from other categories. Because it is easy to 
change features through software online attention seekers can add features that mimic those of other 
very different attention seekers. Twitter and Pinterest, for example, have both recently introduced 
“buy buttons” that help businesses make sales on their platforms, like Amazon Marketplace, in 
addition to just advertising to those consumers.  That feature competition is an example of dynamic 
competition which we turn to next. 
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C. Dynamic Competition 
Dynamic competition has characterized online attention seekers for the last twenty years and 
shows no signs of abating.  Attention seekers have no guarantee that they can hold onto consumers 
without engaging in persistent incremental feature and disruptive innovation. We see this in a variety 
of ways. 
First, the relative importance of attention seekers changes dramatically over time.44  Table 3 
shows the 20 largest advertising-supported attention seekers by time spent on the webpage in 2002, 
2007, and 2012. Pinterest (8) is a US advertising supported webpages that users spent the most time 
visiting during September 2012 did not exist in September 2007, while several webpages were in the 
early stages of development including Facebook (1), Youtube (2), The Huffington Post (9), and 
Tumblr (10). This illustrates how quickly and dramatically the landscape for online advertising can 
change. 
Second, successful attention seekers have declined and in some cases failed when they have 
not kept up, while new ones have risen quickly. Orkut was the dominant social networking site 
between 2005 and 2010 in India.45 Facebook overtook it in July 2010.46  MySpace had a similar 
experience in the US where it was the largest between 2005 and 2009 and also displaced by 
Facebook.47  Yahoo was a highly successful attention seeker for many years. While it still attracts a 
                                                            
44 See David Evans, “Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms,” Journal of Competition Law & Economics, May 14, 
2013, Volume 9 Issue 2:313-357. 
45 Sahil Shah, “Social Networking War in India: Facebook vs Orkut,” January 25, 2011, 
https://www.techinasia.com/indian-social-networking-wars-facebook-vs-orkut-2 
46 comScore, “Facebook and Orkut Growth in India,” November 4, 2010. http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Data-
Mine/Facebook-and-Orkut-Growth-in-India 
47 Pete Cashmore, “MySpace, America's Number One,” July 11, 2006, http://mashable.com/2006/07/11/myspace-
americas-number-one/#tqA37Md.SgqA; Choloe Albanesius “Home/News & Analysis/More Americans Go To 
Facebook Than MySpace 
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large number of pageviews the market value of the portion of advertising-supported portion of the 
business is negligible according to various reports.48   
Third, mobile apps have provided opportunities for the creation of new attention seekers 
and have reduced the relative importance of incumbent attention seekers.  Facebook, for example, 
has become one of the largest online advertising platforms in the world through its success in 
attracting attention of mobile device users and selling that attention to advertisers.  It now provides 
three of the ten mobile apps that attract the largest number of page views.49  Traditional search 
advertising, while still important on mobile, is much less significant than it is on the web. 
 
D. Market Shares as Indicia of Market Power 
 
A number of commentators have pointed out that market shares must be used with care in 
assessing market power.50 This advice is particularly sound when it comes to measuring market 
power on the consumer side of online attention platforms.  In traditional markets sound practice 
involves measuring market shares based on value to account for quality differences between 
products.  It also makes sense to focus on price because it is an important dimension of 
competition. Most online attention seekers do not charge consumers for using the platform. Price is  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
More Americans Go To Facebook Than MySpace,” June 16, 2009, 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2348822,00.asp. 
48 Steven Levy, “Yahoo and Alibaba: Joined at the Balance Sheet,” March 3, 2015, 
https://medium.com/backchannel/yahoo-and-alibaba-joined-at-the-balance-sheet-94b459233894#.cklylx3x3; Lawrence 
Meyers, “Yahoo Stock: Is YHOO Worth Nothing Without BABA?,” September 21, 2015, 
http://investorplace.com/2015/09/yahoo-stock-yhoo-baba-alibaba/#.VnNaiPkrKM8.   
49 comScore, “comScore Reports July 2015 U.S. Smartphone Subscriber Market Share,” September 3, 2015 
50 Louis Kaplow, “Market Definition, Market Power,” May 2015, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605179## ; Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan, 
“Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power,” Economic Evidence in Antitrust, 
http://web.stanford.edu/~tbres/research/buccirossi_01_ch01_001-042.pdf; Howard H. Change, David S. Evans, and 
Richard Schmalensee, “Assessment of the Relevant Market in Competition Matters,” March 30, 2011.  
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Domain Description
Rank
Sept-2002
Rank
Sept-2007
Rank
Sept-2012
Facebook.com Social Networking - - 1
Youtube.com Video - - 2
Yahoo.com Portal 1 1 3
Google.com Search 3 3 4
Msn.com Portal 2 2 5
Aol.com Portal 4 4 6
Bing.com Search - - 7
Pinterest.com Online Pinboard - - 8
Huffingtonpost.com News - - 9
Tumblr.com Social Networking - - 10
Pandora.com Music - - 11
Nfl.com Sports 9 7 12
Cnn.com News 14 5 13
Tagged.com Social Networking - - 14
Foxnews.com News - 18 15
Nbcnews.com News - - 16
Ask.com Search 16 10 17
Fanfiction.net Hobby/Interest - 9 18
Cbssports.com Sports - - 19
Mapquest.com Maps 17 6 20
Weather.com Weather 18 17 -
Cartoonnetwork.com Entertainment 19 - -
Foxsports.com Sports - 12 -
Nytimes.com News 11 - -
Mlb.com Sports - 13 -
About.com Reference - 19 -
Usatoday.com News - 20 -
Imdb.com Movie Reference - 16 -
Univision.com Entertainment - 15 -
Blackplanet.com Social Networking 6 14 -
Livejournal.com Blogging 13 - -
Blogger.com Blogging - 11 -
Excite.com Search 8 - -
Iwon.com Portal 10 - -
Lycos.com Search 5 - -
Netscape.com Software 7 - -
Altavista.com Search 20 - -
Hotmail.com Web Mail - 8 -
Ezboard.com Discussion 12 - -
Asianavenue.com Social Networking 15 - -
Source: Compete.com, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012
Table 3: Top 20 US Advertising Supported Attention Seeker Websites in 
September 2002, 2007, and 2012, Ranked by User Time Spent on the 
Webpage
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therefore not available as a measure of quality differences and for that matter is not an important 
element of competition relative to the content and service subsidies. 
Market shares are poor indicia of market power for online attention seekers in part because 
precise market boundaries are more difficult to establish.  Narrow market definitions, confined to 
functional substitutes for the content or services provided by the platform, seldom make sense 
because consumers shift their attention fluidly among different platforms.  That is not to say that a 
broad definition is appropriate either since many platforms have some source of differentiation that 
makes consumers more likely to give them their attention. To the extent market shares are used they 
should be calculated using different plausible definitions of the relevant set of substitutes.  
V. Conclusion  
Multi-sided platforms comprise an increasingly large portion of the economy, in part as a 
result of the technological changes described above.  Online multi-sided platforms are now behind 
waves of creative destruction.  Protecting competition in this part of the economy is important and 
competition authorities should be commended for being vigilant in making sure that dominant 
platforms do not violate the competition rules and that rent-seeking incumbents do not stand in the 
way of innovative new platforms. 
Antitrust analysis, however, needs to adjust the standard tools for assessing market power so 
that they are accurate, as a matter of economics and mathematics, for multi-sided platforms. That 
includes recognizing that important implications of interdependent demand, and interlinked sides, 
for platforms.  Particular care is needed to online platforms, and especially online attention seekers, 
because of the importance of non-price competition, the pervasive use for zero prices, and the role, 
at least for now, of intense dynamic competition.   
